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Why Should Mainstream Social Researchers 
Be Interested in Action Research? 
Olav Eikeland 
The essay tries to argue why conventional researchers are obliged as re-
searchers to be interested in certain forms of action research. The 60 years 
of ignorance have been illegitimate. The essay starts by listing two com-
monly encountered arguments paraphrasing Karl Marx and Francis Bacon 
via Kurt Lewin. It tries to show why a certain simplified reading of Marx 
cannot provide the necessary arguments. It then presents different variants 
of action research in order to single out approaches that according to this 
author require attention from mainstream social researchers. The action 
research approach emerging as central, by demonstrating its presence and 
effectiveness within mainstream research as well, is immanent critique. 
The method of research methodology is immanent critique. Immanent cri-
tique has to be demystified, however. When it is brought down to earth, 
immanent critique is really the kind of dialogical and experiential learning 
approach associated with apprenticeship learning and with organisational 
learning. This conclusion, making self-reflective practitioner-research the 
“hard-core” of action research, even internal to mainstream research, also 
requires a revision of the experimentalist-as-interventionist credo of action 
research. 
Key words: action research, counter-public spheres, immanent critique, 
method of methodology, practitioner research, research methods 
The purpose of this essay is to answer one question: Why should conven-
tional social researchers be interested in action research? My general back-
ground for trying to provide an answer is 1) being a philosopher with a spe-
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cial interest in the relations of ancient Greek philosophy of dialogue to mod-
ern social research and action research (cf. e.g. Eikeland 2007a, 2007b), and 
2) having worked practically as an action researcher in projects in Norwegian 
work life, mostly municipalities, almost continuously since the mid-1980s, 
and with similar projects for several years before that. 
There are many reasons why conventional social researchers should be in-
terested in action research, but only limited space is available here. Hence, I 
will try to focus on my arguments searching for reasons, writing as if reason-
ing actually could direct the interests of anyone. Trying to let the arguments 
speak for themselves, references will be kept to an absolute minimum in what 
follows1. As another consequence of the space limitations, none of the argu-
ments can be elaborated extensively, of course. They will all have to be in 
outline, only. 
But there are many different variants of action research as well, requiring 
some kind of selection. All of them are not equally defensible, neither to the 
same degree nor in the same ways. Conventional social researchers are hardly 
obliged to show an equal interest in all forms. But I think they are obliged in 
relation to some, that is, if they take their own research business seriously. In 
a way, I will be experimenting my way ahead openly and argumentatively in 
what follows, having a kind of textual dialogue with myself and with the 
reader. I will try to select, by way of gradual elimination, what I think are the 
most promising action research approaches to defend. In real life, many of 
the approaches are combined, of course. But this makes it even more impor-
tant to keep them analytically apart when arguing. 
On the way through this text, then, many secondary and subsidiary argu-
ments supporting some forms of action research will be examined and passed 
by, which I am sure will weigh heavily for some. But such arguments are not 
the main reasons why conventional researchers should be interested in action 
                                          
1  Further arguments and references to other authors and research literature indicating 
what I try to argue here are to be found in e.g. Eikeland (1985, 1995, 1997, 1998, 
2001, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2006d, 2007a, 2007b). Interested readers will also find my 
reasons for thinking that answers to almost all the challenges raised in this text can be 
developed by taking seriously into account the more than 2000 years old works of Ar-
istotle, among many others, of course.  
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research. I consider them subsidiary arguments because they appeal to re-
searchers qua human beings, qua socially or politically responsible individu-
als, qua commercially interested actors, etc. but not qua researchers. This 
means, in other words, that subsidiary arguments appeal to all human beings, 
all socially and politically responsible individuals, etc. but not to researchers 
in particular. But secondary and subsidiary arguments still carry considerable 
weight. I will end up with what I think are some quite strong reasons, seen 
from the perspective of research in general, for some quite promising variants 
of action research.  
Two arguments 
The starting point for raising the question to be answered at all is the fact that 
action research has been carried on by dedicated researcher-practitioners at 
least since the 1940s. During the same period of time, and in spite of its ori-
gin in “hardcore” social science, action research has been almost completely 
ignored and neglected by what might be called “mainstream” currents of so-
cial research. It still is. But the challenge in this essay is not to explain why 
60 years have passed by in this way. It is to provide arguments justifying why 
this situation should not be allowed to continue. So, why should mainstream 
social researchers be interested in action research? 
Let me start by saying generally and imprecisely that action research is re-
search, somehow concerned with practice and with some kind of social and 
personal change. Why should mainstream researchers be interested in any-
thing like that? One argument often encountered sounds somewhat like this: 
(I) Mainstream researchers should be interested because they ought to change 
the world, instead of just interpreting or explaining it, like Karl Marx pointed 
out in his famous Feuerbach theses. 
A second argument often found is (II) that researchers should be inter-
ested because we simply have to change things in order to understand them, 
as Francis Bacon argued in promoting experimentalism in natural science 400 
years ago, and action researchers often quote Kurt Lewin for paraphrasing. 
Personally, I think the second argument (II) provides the best starting point 
 Why Should Mainstream Social Researchers Be Interested in Action Research? 41
for a discussion. It strikes researchers more in particular, while the first one 
(I) strikes everyone equally.  
Don’t just interpret the world, change it! 
But the first argument (I) still needs to be dismissed properly as part of my 
justification strategy here. So, let me state the following before leaving it be-
hind: The first argument uses Marx in a somewhat moralistic tapping. It 
really tells people to drop whatever they’re doing and go do something else 
instead. But why should anyone go do something else, e.g. change things? Of 
course, with the earth’s climate altering dramatically, there are mandatory ar-
guments urging us all to make changes if we want to survive. Global climate 
changes actually challenge us qua biological beings. Also, in large parts of 
the world, social and economic injustice is so grave and intolerable it seems 
to demand some change efforts from us qua human beings. Qua biological 
beings or qua human beings with a moral conscience, researchers should use 
their expertise in order to contribute to the solution of challenges like these. 
Indeed, everyone should use whatever expertise they dispose of in order to 
solve challenges like these. But are any dramatic challenges like these facing 
mainstream researchers qua researchers, requiring them to change not only 
the extrinsic purposes, for which research is done, but the very way they do 
research? 
Basically, the first argument says nothing in particular to researchers e.g. 
about changing research methods, i.e. about doing what they do in different 
ways. At best it tells researchers to do what they do but for different pur-
poses; in order to serve other causes. But qua researchers, mainstream re-
searchers are normally not into changing things, neither external nor internal 
to their research activity. Their job is to describe, analyse, interpret, explain, 
and understand. Should researchers simply stop doing that, but still continue 
to call themselves “researchers”? Hardly! According to conventional wisdom, 
their ways of doing research do not imply changing things. According to 
conventional wisdom, the opposite is required in order to eliminate biased 
and illegitimate researcher influences on their “findings”, i.e. in order to se-
cure general validity. If action research is merely a method for creating 
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change, mainstreamers might ask in return why anyone should call an activity 
like that “research” at all. The question under discussion is: What arguments 
will convince mainstream researchers qua researchers about the merits of ac-
tion research? Shaking moralistic fingers at them will probably not do it. 
Unqualified, then, the first argument tends to confirm prevalent prejudices 
among mainstream researchers against action research. Some of the carica-
tures and prejudices against action research are that it is sloppy research, po-
litically prejudiced research, anti-theoretical or theoretically uninformed re-
search, just short-sighted problem solving and hardly research at all, mere 
“activism” and “moralism” using insufficient methods, etc. Allegations like 
these may, of course, be true against some action-researchers. They are un-
doubtedly pertinent against some other kinds of researchers too. But a serious 
discussion about action research (and any other kinds) needs to elevate itself 
above merely discussing poor or good performers singularly. Poor perform-
ance by one or another practitioner does not necessarily indicate that poor 
general standards of measurement are involved just as a novice or amateur 
performance of a violin concerto does not prove that the concerto itself is no 
good. Insufficient performance does not necessarily indicate that these poor 
performers are pursuing the wrong ends. 
But the question to be answered is not: Why should mainstream research-
ers be interested in any one (or more) action researcher(s) in particular? The 
question concerns action research as such, if any “as such” of action research 
can be distilled. Also, in order to understand and evaluate either good or bad 
performance in the singular we need to understand what general standards of 
excellence or performance and what basic principles are involved and at stake 
in the singular cases. We need to understand what the performers are trying 
to achieve. If any one in particular is interesting, it is because s/he is doing 
something of general interest, i.e. relevant for what others are doing. Hence, 
the question would be: How is action or changing things relevant not only as 
a subject of extraneous study, but for the performance of the practice of re-
search itself? 
But, furthermore, are there general reasons for suspecting an action re-
search mainly interested in changing things of sloppy research? Unfortu-
nately, I think there are. If the research efforts are actually subordinated to 
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the change efforts, the implications are that we should or could only do re-
search to the extent, as exactly as, and as well as necessary for our practical 
purposes. Working under the exigencies of getting certain things done within 
certain time limits, we do not need to and hardly ever have the opportunity to 
do as much research as possible as well as possible in order to delve deeper 
into the studied subject. For practical purposes, reaching the practical aims 
set within certain time limits is decisive, and (at best) we take what knowl-
edge we need from wherever it is available to us. For practical purposes, 
promoting a particular change and acting under time pressure and other exi-
gencies, a part of the truth or some approximate truth often has to suffice. In 
addition, a lot of different means, apparently having nothing at all to do with 
truth or knowledge, may be quite expedient for creating all sorts of social 
changes, of course. Of course, for most practical purposes, the best would be 
to have the necessary knowledge already, i.e. that no extra research was nec-
essary. As perfected professional practitioners, we could then concentrate on 
performance, applying practically and in the best possible way, the knowl-
edge and competence we already have. 
But it would be rather naïve to think that having research as such – i.e. for 
the sake of theory, understanding the studied subject increasingly better – as 
an independent and superior aim, could not easily come into conflict with 
practical aims like this. In a way, it is elementary research ethics that it could 
and easily will. There are common precautions circulating to prevent it. I 
would be quite surprised if many action researchers have not experienced 
situations like I have, where they would have liked to pursue better knowl-
edge and understanding but were prevented because of the “practical re-
quirements” of the project(s) they’re in.  
Unfortunately for the first argument (I), I think history also has shown 
many times how settings like these result in half-hearted research, and a half-
hearted commitment to truth and knowledge in order to promote (or restrain) 
social or personal change sufficiently whole-heartedly. I continue to presume 
that the primary interest of researchers is to do research whole-heartedly even 
if and when it might be critical of certain practical change (or restraint) ef-
forts. So, once more, if what we primarily want to do is to promote (or re-
strain) changes in the world in directions pre-specified by ideology, theory, 
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tradition, or whatever, why not drop the somewhat pretentious research bit 
and concentrate on action? In most countries, there are still many legitimate 
ways of doing this openly and politically, democratically (or privately, for 
that matter). Where there aren’t, the arguments take us outside what can be 
pursued in this essay. 
Of course, the real insufficiency of the first argument (I) is that the chal-
lenge hardly allows an either (action) – or (research) solution. The meaning, 
even of Marx, is hardly: Change the world (in whatever way) instead of in-
terpreting and explaining it! Neither could it be simply: Stop interpreting and 
explaining the world! Not only researchers but all of us inevitably interpret 
and explain the world somehow. Hence, the questions to everyone have to be: 
How do we interpret the world, how do we know our interpretation or expla-
nation is any good, and what has changing the world got to do with that? In 
deed, if our understanding isn’t any good, how could we possibly act appro-
priately in order to achieve the wanted changes? With an erroneous or insuf-
ficient interpretation and explanation we will probably end up with results 
quite different from (and actually subversive of) those we started out with 
wanting (and with many casualties on the way). I believe the experiences 
from a number of socio-political revolutions, small and big, bear witness to 
this. Of course, this also shows why good practitioners need adequate knowl-
edge. The question is, then: how can they get that? 
But then again, maybe action research should be construed as the applica-
tion of existing research results – theories and data – in order to promote e.g. 
development, democracy, and social justice? Maybe so, provided that extant 
knowledge is sufficient and adequate, but will this convince mainstream re-
searchers? They’re into doing research, not into applying its results. Is the 
mere application of theories and research-results the same as doing research? 
Hardly! Making action research into the mere application of existing knowl-
edge may easily just confirm the existing division of labour between knowl-
edge producers and knowledge appliers. In a way, this answer begs the whole 
question since it raises new questions about how the applied knowledge is 
produced, tested, and validated. As I return to below, the division of labour 
between knowledge producers and appliers is part of the problem but hardly 
of the solution. 
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But assuming, for the argument’s sake, that existing knowledge (theories 
and data), or knowledge produced by conventional research methods, is all 
we need. We have the knowledge. All we need is to apply it. One of the chal-
lenges is that the knowledge is produced and provided by people different 
from those supposed to use or apply it. This produces transaction costs of in-
terpretation and misunderstandings at every joint. Currently, attempts at mak-
ing research knowledge relevant as “actionable” or “workable” are high on 
the agenda, but quite often without asking questions about what kind of 
knowledge is attempted conveyed, i.e. without asking any questions about 
how, by whom and for what the knowledge is generated in the first place; 
about the relationship between application, mediation, learning, research, and 
knowledge generation in general. But this is decisive. All kinds of existing 
knowledge generated in any ways whatsoever, are neither available, nor ap-
plicable, nor actionable in the same way or to the same degree by just any-
one. 
But the quality of the application-answer also depends, of course, on how
existing knowledge is applied. The application could be done 1) technically,
treating people as objects to be manipulated. It could be done 2) didactically,
treating people as “containers” of verbalised knowledge or as listening stu-
dents supposed to apply their thus acquired learning for themselves. Or, it 
could be done 3) deliberatively, through some form of conversation or dia-
logue, trying to convey and adjust insights from conventional research, phi-
losophy, or whatever, to practitioners and to practical problem solution, 
searching together deliberatively for the best action alternatives. It could also 
be done 4) manipulatively of course, persuading or seducing people into 
“buying” solutions offered by research. To the extent that application is part 
of their business at all, most action researchers would undoubtedly subscribe 
explicitly to the third way no matter what their tacit practices were. It adjusts 
better to where practitioners are, taking that as its starting point. 
Many of the activities called action research are clearly conceived as col-
laborative efforts where researchers and practitioners cooperate in practical 
efforts to change and develop organisations or communities, bringing in their 
different perspectives and background knowledge to complement each other 
mutually. The researchers do not necessarily do research within this kind of 
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collaboration, however. Frequently, they work as advisors or consultants 
based on their mostly theoretical, pre-existing knowledge. Engineers, shop 
stewards, directors, board members, and researchers could all meet as peer 
participants in project work contributing their share to the project. But none 
of these collaborators necessarily perform as engineers, as shop stewards, as
directors, as researchers, etc. during their project work. Doing this and that 
kind of specialist work is where each one comes from, and from whence his 
or her practical advice springs. It is also what s/he returns to after and outside 
the collaborative project work. 
For many working with participatory methods in development and 
change, this is an end in itself, as a way of broadening democratic practices. 
But although participation and democracy are important ends, mere participa-
tion or democratic procedures cannot guarantee the quality of the knowledge 
produced, nor can it guarantee the quality of the participation itself. In gen-
eral, development projects often have practical ends, making knowledge gen-
eration and the quality of such generative processes into a secondary and 
subordinated concern. For conventional researchers who still want to actually 
do research, not consultancy, teaching, therapy, democracy promotion, or 
something else, this is hardly convincing. 
Various ways of doing action research 
But still, many questions remain: How was the applied or conveyed knowl-
edge produced and tested in the first place? What kind of knowledge is ap-
plied? General rules or statements taken from textbooks? Competence ac-
quired through practical experience? A little of both this and that? How is 
practical and experiential knowledge and competence developed? Most ac-
tion researchers would not agree that they simply apply theories and data 
produced by other kinds of research. In addition, hardly any action research-
ers would admit that they are simply applying already existing research re-
sults. So, if knowledge and competence is applied at all, where does it come 
from? How has it been validated? If pre-existing knowledge is not simply ap-
plied, how, when, and where is necessary and relevant knowledge produced? 
What kind of knowledge and competence are we talking about? 
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Change efforts are at least sometimes open ended or oriented towards 
vaguely formulated ends or “visions”. They are not always pre-specified, 
aiming for given ends, simply following predefined precepts and patterns, 
implementing recipes. In the production of advanced technical solutions, this 
may be the only way to attain anything, of course. But, in deed, social and 
personal changes rarely proceed or achieve anything like this, even if they 
were planned that way. Social and personal change and development is not 
algorithmic, nor can they rely on unambiguous connections between efficient 
causes and effects. Far from everything involved in changing social relations 
or organisations can be fully known in advance. Local conditions and indi-
vidual starting points vary. They require adjustments. More open-ended 
change projects also require different approaches from merely promoting 
ideologically or theoretically defined changes. It means, of course, that new 
knowledge of some kind must somehow be produced as part of the change ef-
fort itself and actually be used formatively to develop the project and its aims 
as well. Knowledge generation and application would then have to be in-
cluded as a running concern within the change effort itself. If local conditions 
serve as the starting point for improvements and adjustments, as they neces-
sarily must, knowledge generation and change efforts have to be integrated. 
Providing the lacking knowledge or supplementing insufficient knowl-
edge could reasonably be called action learning or research. Of course, since 
the mid-1960s, with the decline of the first wave of action research from the 
1940s and 1950s, similar efforts have often been labelled “evaluation re-
search” as well. But introducing such integrated and open-ended change-
cum-research as iterative and formative cycles of knowledge generation into 
development projects – as cycles of action research or action learning – is 
probably what most existing action researchers would agree on in principle as 
identifying their work. So, how do action researchers produce, test, and vali-
date knowledge? 
On this question, the really existing action research approaches and re-
searchers differ much. As far as I can see, the divisions in the following table 
capture the most important differences. For reasons of space and in order to 
avoid discussing singular approaches, I will not fill in the numbered blank 
squares.
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Table 1 
 C. Applying conventional 
research techniques 
D. Radical self-reflection 
A. Collaborative action research 1 2 
B. Practitioner action research 3 4 
Many confessed action researchers in category A define action research as an 
essentially collaborative effort between a) professional researchers located at 
specialised academic research and educational institutions and b) practitio-
ners (non-researching or co-researching) in different parts of work life. Oth-
ers, in category B, think of action research primarily as the practitioners do-
ing the research themselves. Within both of these categories (A and B) there 
are many (C) who think of action research primarily as the application of 
conventional research techniques like gathering and analysing the results 
from i) posing questions in different ways, from ii) observing in different 
ways, or from iii) experimenting. Others (D) within both categories (A and 
B) think of action research as basically something different or something 
more than applying conventional research techniques, i.e. as some form of 
radical self-reflection.
Collaboration between researchers and practitioners in category A may at-
tract researchers for many reasons, of course, not the least pecuniary. In the 
current social climate where international competition is apparently forcing 
politicians everywhere to become increasingly business oriented and overtly 
utilitarian, more public money is channelled to finance research that seems 
useful for business innovation and commercialisation, less to free and inde-
pendent research. But money is very persuasive, independently from personal 
convictions and from any intrinsic qualities of the money-conveyors. So is 
power and force, of course. If persuasive arguments like these count, then, 
this will certainly persuade many conventional researchers into something 
that could somehow pass as action research. But they are probably persuaded 
because of the money, the influence, and the personal opportunities they open 
up, not because of any intrinsic research qualities of action research. People 
mainly persuaded by money and similar media will of course accept or dis-
card anything depending on its money-generating qualities. Within commis-
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sioned research, the persuasiveness of means like these is becoming great due 
to increased and enforced market exposure among other things. If something 
called action research is in demand by money and power, it will attract peo-
ple. If conventional research is in demand, so will it. Hence, this – might we 
call it research “opportunism” – is hardly an argument for action research as 
such. It is an argument for anything in demand by people able to demand. 
The question is whether research approaches combining A-C or B-C in 
the table will convince conventional researchers. The A-C combination is the 
mentioned collaborative approach between established research institutions 
and “non- or co-research” practitioners in work life. The B-C combination 
also implies something already happening. This is the current transfer of con-
ventional research competence and activity from protected and insulated re-
search “academies” to “normal” work life organisations. In our late modern, 
ICT-dominated era, normal work places and normal jobs increasingly include 
the application of research methods more or less advanced and more or less 
professionally applied (using statistics, interviews, laboratory testing, field 
work, etc.). This social transfer and redistribution of research competence and 
practices challenges the institutionalised social division of labour between 
producers and appliers of knowledge, of course. 
Although both of these (A-C / B-C) too may be called applied research, 
this is a different application from the one mentioned above. There, it con-
cerned the application of existing theories and research results used as a gen-
eral background for collaborating on a par with others in practical projects, 
i.e. without necessarily doing research in the projects. Here, it concerns spe-
cific research methods used to serve objectives set by others in collaboration 
or by the practitioners themselves. For researchers who want to use their 
methodological research expertise in order to promote certain commercial, 
ethical, or political ends, I am sure the A-C combination will be attractive as 
long as the researchers are given specific research tasks within a collaborative 
project. But this is still something motivated by relations external to the re-
search activity itself. Hardly anything needs to change regarding research 
methods. Researchers only have to use their identical methods for slightly 
different purposes, serving some business project or some political cause or 
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movement as servants of power, as servants of the people, or in some other 
servant position. Anyhow, research is subservient. 
Within scenarios like these, opportunities will obviously also come up for 
researchers to work as teachers or tutors for practitioners who want to in-
crease their proficiency in conventional research methods. Many historical 
variants of action research have certainly worked within an applied horizon 
like this, not unreasonably ascribed to Max Weber as its originator. But since 
it merely applies conventional research methods, the term “action research” 
may seem superfluous and even confusing. For many researchers, whose 
main wish is to do research, doing research in the conventional way within 
well established research institutions will be more attractive, if the precondi-
tions for doing it well are provided. Doing research well is the clue, and the 
A-D / B-D combinations in the table remain to be discussed. 
Improving research methods 
Basically, the kind of arguments that will really convince conventional re-
searchers mainly interested in doing research of the merits of action research 
must be research-intrinsic arguments that concern the quality of their research 
activity as such. For intrinsically motivated researchers, research intrinsic ar-
guments bite the most. All researchers are not obliged, qua researchers, to let 
their research serve specific external causes. They may be qua human beings, 
perhaps, but not qua researchers. But in a way, all researchers are profession-
ally obliged to heed research intrinsic arguments, unless they want to be 
charged with doing “sloppy research”. Researchers have to do research in the 
best possible ways available, adjusted to the subjects studied in the best pos-
sible way, studying real challenges at some frontier of knowledge. Whenever 
research is subordinated to some other purpose, this is threatened. “I’m only 
in it for the money”, or, “I’m only doing this because it serves this or that po-
litical cause”, is hardly a convincing research justification. Demanding 
whole-hearted, top-quality research from researchers qua researchers is both 
reasonable and necessary (if politicians provide the preconditions). Hence, in 
a way, such arguments are the only ones that ought to convince researchers if 
our general confidence in research is to be preserved. But does anything 
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reminiscent of action research have any such arguments in its favour? I think 
it does. 
Arguments about using all kinds of research techniques in order to pro-
mote all sorts of good ethical, political, or commercial causes may, of course, 
mobilise many researchers. Probably they will not only receive but actually 
deserve true praise for taking social and economic responsibility too. But 
such arguments will not mobilise them for research-intrinsic reasons. Such 
research use could easily be incorporated into mainstream activities simply as 
ways of applying the existing research resources. They hardly need a contro-
versial term like “action research” in order to do that. 
As indicated already, the A-D and B-D combinations in the table have not 
been discussed yet. In a sense, they presuppose that there are some important 
forms of knowledge generating activity still not integrated into normal re-
search procedures. Seen from the perspective of conventional research, peo-
ple in both the D categories seem to be doing something “completely differ-
ent”. But are not all social research activities just various ways of observing, 
questioning, or experimenting – including reading, thinking, etc. already im-
plied in observing, etc? I think the best way to illustrate is by showing how 
such non-integrated but still essential activities are internal, like a Trojan 
horse, to normal ways of doing research “in spite of themselves”. 
Normal research methodology recommends variants and combinations of 
the approaches just mentioned for empirical research. But there is an impor-
tant field not covered by these: the methods of methodology itself. Method-
ology as a discipline is not primarily based on questioning, observing, or ex-
perimenting on other researchers in any conventional senses. Anyone trying 
to base methodology on things like this would, of course, have to learn to do 
research properly first, since these are research methods. But from whom, if 
we need to know how before learning how? They say methodology is norma-
tive. And so it is, but I would claim it is still empirical. 
Making a long story short, my contention is that, basically, methodology 
is built on the self-reflections of the research community, founded on the 
community members’ long-term, practically acquired experience from doing 
research, i.e. as research practitioners. Over time, this practical self-
consciousness is produced by an enduring learning process that gives identity 
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to the research profession. Methodology, then, is knowledge developed “in-
side-out”, “bottom-up” by practitioners within a certain community of prac-
tice by sifting and sorting similarities and differences in their own acquired 
habitus and experience. Methodological knowledge is “actionable”, practical 
knowledge produced as such by practitioners, not “translated” or conveyed 
back to practitioners after having first been produced by spectators, visitors, 
or manipulators as non-actionable knowledge. Any “translation” within the 
community of practitioners is between peers alternating as masters and 
apprentices whose practice is either closer to or further away from common 
standards of reference in “perfect” performance. The saying that those wear-
ing the shoes know best where they squeeze and gnaw becomes even truer 
through procedures like these. Simultaneously, this method of methodology 
is not subordinating research to any practice. It is putting the research prac-
tice at the very centre of attention and at the very centre of every practice. 
Strangely enough, although clearly empirical (if empirical still has any-
thing at all to do with its roots in experience), this is not normally included 
among the recommended empirical methods of mainstream empirical re-
search. This strangeness is increased by the fact that methodology is not an 
incidental or peripheral discipline. It is actually what gives public legitimacy 
to the whole business of professional research. But still, this crucially impor-
tant and powerful discipline is not recommended for other professions who 
are required to make their professional practices so-called “research-based” 
in order to increase their legitimacy. Research is a practice among other prac-
tices. But the profession of the social research practitioners is hardly research 
based in the required sense. Hence, the question is: Why cannot other profes-
sions do as the research professions; justify their professionalism through 
systematic and collective self-reflection based on native or practitioner ex-
perience and analysis?     
Implicitly or explicitly, this is the question raised by the A-D and B-D 
combinations in the table above. At least, this kind of self-reflective activity 
is what characterizes these approaches. There is something crucial not in-
cluded in the methods of normal empirical research, then. This kind of self-
reflection is missing. And this, I claim, is also the “hard core” of action re-
search. The methods of mainstream research methodology are action research 
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methods as good as any. As long as mainstreamers and action researchers of 
these kinds do not realize that they have the methods of methodology in 
common, the A-D and B-D combination appear to be “cut off” from the nor-
mal business of empirical research, i.e. from the externally recommended 
methods of empirical research. They’re apparently simply not doing the same 
sort of things, and action research appears to be out of touch with ordinary re-
search. But this is hardly true. 
The method of methodology is hardly “cut off” or “out of touch” in this 
sense, although what it does is quite different from ordinary empirical re-
search. But it coincides with action research. The method of methodology – 
i.e. hard core action research – is the heart and brain of all research. Action 
research of the B-D combination is developing the methods of research 
methodology from within the methodologies of other professions or activi-
ties, that’s all. They’re doing what the research profession has been doing for 
themselves all along: analysing their own activity experientially and as na-
tives from within in order to improve it, i.e. practical, actionable knowledge 
produced directly from practice by practitioners. 
Taken comprehensively over time the discipline of methodology has even 
been doing it “paradigmatically” or in exemplary ways from which all action 
researchers could and should even learn. To the extent that specialised action 
researchers of the A-D combination are doing similar things, they either work 
openly as facilitators in the self-reflective processes of others, or they are re-
fining their so-called “intervention methods” more clandestinely through in-
ternal self-reflection in narrower circles for their own benefit or for that of 
novices in their profession. But the most essential and “hard core” part of ac-
tion research is not based on intervention by outsiders into the lives and prac-
tices of others. Intervention cannot rid itself of a manipulative taint. Hard 
core action research is not intervention but collective self-reflection. Anyhow 
and ultimately, then, the action research in both the D categories is both to-
tally different and cut off from mainstream research, and still, at heart, com-
mon and exactly the same. Mainstreamers are not always as meticulous as 
they should be in their own discipline of methodology, however, to say noth-
ing about their accuracy in the methods of methodology. 
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Inherent mainstream insufficiencies 
In general, the approaches mentioned – observing, questioning, experiment-
ing – are recommended as empirical by the discipline of research methodol-
ogy. But most conventional social research within major disciplines like so-
ciology, political science, and anthropology no longer really count the ex-
periment within their methodological repertoire (if they ever did?). Some 
psychologists still do. But the disciplines mentioned mostly stick to questions 
and observations as empirical methods. But are these methods the best avail-
able? The necessary self-reflection presupposed even by mainstream research 
– the method of methodology – indicates they may not be. Also, this is where 
a consideration of the second argument (II) supporting action research above, 
becomes particularly relevant. 
At least since Francis Bacon, 400 years ago, experimentation has gener-
ally been seen as the most basic and reliable method of research. Bacon’s fa-
mous idols (idola tribus, idola specus, idola fori, idola theatri) were invali-
dating distortions bothering mere receptive and inactive observation from 
afar through the senses in particular. Bacon knew quite well that everything 
taken in perceptually through the senses is thoroughly interpreted and satu-
rated by particular prejudiced perspectives – the idols – a condition general-
ised today into a kind of post-modernistic stalemated absolution and simulta-
neous suspension of all perspectives indifferently. 
If we distinguish in the conventional way between 1) what we use in order 
to explain and interpret “something” as the explanans or interpretans, from 
2) the “something” itself in need of explanation or interpretation as the ex-
planandum or interpretandum, the 1) explanans or interpretans always has to 
be something we already understand. Since we don’t understand the explan-
andum itself, we make sense of it by seeing it as if it was similar to some-
thing we already understand. This goes for observations, and for the answers 
to questions posed, as well. We necessarily explain and interpret, i.e. under-
stand at all, by means of whatever knowledge and understanding we already 
have. The opposite would be absurd, i.e. explaining something obscure by 
something even more obscure, although this has been common for centuries, 
receiving its designation – obscurum per obscurius – by the medieval scho-
lastics referring to a passage in Aristotle’s Physics warning about this possi-
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bility. For some, the necessities of explanation seem to make the universe 
thoroughly metaphorical. Everything seems to be understood by means of 
something else transferred, ending up in an endless regression. 
But quite basically, our understanding of any explanation or interpretation 
is ultimately referred back to and founded in our acquired and accumulated 
experience (Erfahrung not Erlebnis). This experience is not simply some-
thing else transferred from somewhere else. It is basically formed and gener-
ated over a certain time and somewhere specifically, repeating things over 
and over. This does not produce another explanandum needing explanation. It 
produces new basic understanding, i.e. a new explanans that can be used to 
understand or interpret new observations. Hence, equally basically, experi-
menting with nature, or more generally with whatever subject is studied, de-
liberately intervening and changing it in controllable ways, was and is an at-
tempt at moving beyond the “idolatry” of arbitrary spectator interpretations 
by non-participants from afar. Experimentation – trying things out again and 
again – is gaining new experience first-hand with whatever our knowledge, 
interpretation, or explanation is about. 
The insufficiencies of conventional social research methods – mainly 
variants of questions and observations – are also indicated more specifically 
by a number of objections well-known within methodology and the philoso-
phy of science. I will mention some without delving deeply into them. There 
are two sets of arguments, one concerning the quality of data or relevant ex-
perience, another one concerning the quality of explanations or interpreta-
tions. 
General data insufficiencies and weaknesses 
It is a fact well-known and often repeated in post-positivism that data col-
lected depend on theories in at least two different ways. Such theories do not 
have to be explicitly formulated, of course. More often, they are implicit ba-
sic assumptions. Data collections are selections of data. What are considered 
relevant data to collect depends on some implicit or explicit theory about 
relevance. Explaining or interpreting social conduct, most social researchers 
ignore the positions of the planets and stars as irrelevant data. For astrologers 
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these are the most relevant data, however. The point here is not who is right. 
The point is that their theories of relevance differ widely. 
But the selection of data is not only theory dependent. The data are also 
theory-impregnated or saturated. Sticking to the examples mentioned, hardly 
anyone considers stars and planets holy or divine in any sense anymore. 2000 
year ago, many even among the most educated, definitely did. They were not 
stupid. Many of these understood logic and basic principles of knowledge 
much better than most modern social researchers. Generally, the point about 
the thoroughly interpreted nature of all observations is emphasized. All ob-
servations are interpreted relatively to what we as interpreters bring along. 
There is no rock bottom made of un-interpreted data the way the logical posi-
tivists presupposed. Data are not given. The question is how we interpret and 
how some interpretations may be said to be more adequate than others. 
Merely “unbiased” sense-perception from any distant position is insufficient, 
and so are interpretive positions arbitrarily chosen, of course.  
Another difficulty bothering conventional data collection is the reactivity 
of the collection procedures themselves. Not only are data “non-given” and 
thoroughly interpreted, i.e. hardly data at all. The way they are collected is a 
socially defined activity in itself. Different social contexts influence people in 
different ways. There are hardly any “neutral” contexts, since eliminating 
everything social is impossible and at least not at all neutral. The very con-
sciousness that something called data-collection is going on will, of course, 
influence those involved, either as collectors or as providers. But what is 
sought for are not data influenced and contaminated by the abnormal activity 
of data-collection. The researchers want to know how things are when they 
are not present and influencing, i.e. “naturally” or normally. Different self-
obliterating ways of eliminating research effects have been suggested, like 
“unobtrusive measures”, etc. But conventional research stumbles in its own 
feet, since it is literally standing in its own way. Since researchers are hard to 
eliminate from the research processes, different ways of utilising the interac-
tive effects as relevant information instead of trying to eliminate them have 
been suggested. Since these involve self-reflection, they move conventional 
research closer to hard-core action research as this was depicted above.   
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Finally, concerning data and the realities studied by social research, there 
is the challenge of what might be called indicator-research. The trouble is that 
hardly anything studied by social research can be observed perceptually the 
way e.g. stars, rocks, plants, and animals can. Neither “a state”, “an organisa-
tion”, “the soul”, nor “power”, etc. can be seen, heard, smelled, tasted, or 
touched. Instead, we have to agree on what is to count as signs indicating ac-
tivities of the state, organisation, soul, or power. The emergent current ortho-
doxy sees this as indicating how almost everything is constructed and “un-
real”. That organisations, states, etc. are unreal is, of course, totally absurd 
for practitioners who have to observe the rules and regulations of these very 
real powers practically, every minute of their lives. For researching but non-
participating observers or visitors these things may seem unreal, although 
they observe practically other rules and regulations that seem equally invisi-
ble and quite incomprehensible for those visited or observed. The point is, of 
course, not that any of this is unreal but that you have to participate fully as a 
native in order to experience their reality. “Going native” is not a distortion, it 
is a precondition. If you really are a “native” employee in a specific company 
or public bureaucracy the things you do and how you have to do them are as 
real and influential as the rules of research are for those insiders “native” to 
the research processes who really try to do research. In either case the basic 
rule is: Drop the rules and you are out of the game. You become unreal. 
Problems of explanations and interpretations 
In addition to problems like those above concerning data or experience, there 
are problems concerning explanations and interpretations. I will mention a 
few. The first may be called the challenge of theory pluralism. For the last 
2000 years this has been known as the explanatory principle of “saving the 
phenomena”. For ancient astronomers saving the phenomena was what mat-
tered by means of any logically consistent model able to predict the move-
ments of the light spots on the heavens.  Theory realism was out before Galli-
leo. Theory instrumentalism was in. Inspired by Akiro Kurosawa, it has en-
tered social anthropology as the Rashomon syndrome: The same phenome-
non can be described and interpreted in totally different ways. It is really the 
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challenge of Bacons idols. Any given set of data can be explained in logically 
valid ways by an unlimited number of true and false premises, i.e. theories, if 
you like. In logic, it is well known that true conclusions – e.g. true descrip-
tions – can follow from utterly false premises. If all “fishes” are warm-
blooded (false premise), and all whales are “fishes” (false premise), it follows 
logically that all whales are warm-blooded (true conclusion). Exchange fishes 
with Xs, and you have your logical proof of theory pluralism. Any X will ex-
plain that whales are warm-blooded, and any Y will explain anything, pro-
vided the right changes are made in the model. 
So-called “abduction” has been suggested as a solution for developing 
good explanations, inspired by Charles S. Peirce. But abduction works by 
means of confirming the consequent in logical inferences, i.e. by confirming 
observables like “all whales are warm-blooded” or “the sun always rises in 
the east and sets in the west”. But confirming consequents like these says ab-
solutely nothing about what the antecedents look like, i.e. it says nothing 
about whether e.g. geocentric or heliocentric theories are best for explaining 
the observed movements of the sun. In addition, it says absolutely nothing 
about whether the sun is divine or not, etc. Theories are radically underde-
termined by the data has been another way of putting it by W. v. O. Quine. 
There are other similar challenges, impossible to delve into here, confronting 
all models of explanation and interpretation based on a radical separation be-
tween the knowers and the known.  
Experimenting on the others, or experimenting together? 
The question, then, is: Why have only the mentioned approaches – observa-
tion, questioning, and a certain kind of experimentation – counted as empiri-
cal in social research? One important reason is that the tacit presupposition 
for modern social research has always been that we – the researchers – have 
to study the others. The “field” is always where the others are. “Othering” is 
at the root of the trouble, in allocating performance or execution on the one 
hand and reflection or interpretation on the other to widely different kinds of 
people, not sharing experience. This, then, has to be radically changed. Con-
ventional empirical research is part of this institutionalised division of labour. 
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Although action research is not anti-scientific, in its dominant present form, 
conventional research is part of the problem, not part of the solution. In order 
to improve research methods, conventional social research has to change. 
So, why have most conventional social research disciplines abandoned or 
never even considered experimentation before getting lost in the labyrinths 
and quagmires of post-modernism? If experimentation is simply transferred 
from how natural scientists experiment with objects in nature, i.e. modelled 
on a division of labour between experimenters and those experimented on, 
there are some obvious reasons and a few less obvious. The purely practical 
difficulties in arranging these kinds of experiments in real life social settings 
involving large numbers of people are, of course, striking. In addition, of 
course, many people simply do not want to try out different social arrange-
ments openly in order to learn and improve, for ideological or religious rea-
sons or for fear of exposing illegitimate power structures and positions. The 
ethical scruples about subjecting people to interventions in their lives that 
they may be completely ignorant of and neither understand nor control, are 
salient too. Segregated and protected laboratory experimentation has the 
same shortcomings in addition to the difficulties of external validity, i.e. of 
transferring results from artificial laboratory conditions to real life settings. 
Finally, I would add that normal concepts of efficient causality, mostly over-
looking how the interpretations of the actors involved intervene between 
causes and effects, are much too simple. Similar efficient causes, or even one 
identical cause, necessarily have a multitude of widely different effects de-
pending on the experience, maturity, cultural background, gender, age, psy-
chic condition, available space for autonomous action, etc. of those affected.  
In spite of scruples like these, action research sprang from researchers and 
philosophers like Kurt Lewin and John Dewey, committed to experimenta-
tion. Both men favoured the re-positioning of experimentation moving out 
from insulated laboratories to enter every local community, work place, 
school, and even family. How, then, did the offspring of experimental social 
research – the spearhead of science – end up discredited in a research orphan-
age charged with “sloppy research”? Even action researchers and many vari-
ants of action research have denied their relationship with experimentation, 
appropriating the derogatory definition of them by mainstream research in-
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stead as “extremely applied research”. The major difference, emerging from 
the initiatives of both Dewey and Lewin, was that the division of labour be-
tween researchers and research subjects – treated as objects – began to disin-
tegrate. This was anathema to established research. Heedless of what they 
thought they were doing, what the action research initiative started was a 
movement where ordinary people, workers, managers, teachers, families, etc. 
would start to experiment together, openly, sharing their interpretations criti-
cally in order to improve their own practices, just like researchers through 
their discipline of methodology. This was and is a sore and sensitive blind 
spot for conventional research. 
Action research soon stopped being an attempt to administer manipulative 
and clandestine treatment to others in order to observe how they reacted to 
stimuli. Quasi-experimental research, springing from the same sources, con-
tinues in this vein. But in transferring the experimental attitude and practice 
from laboratories to real life settings, it was also transformed into action re-
search, placing experience-forming experimentation into the practical settings 
of practitioners as open action learning and action research cycles of repeti-
tion, trying things out, evaluating the old and adjusting the new attempts at 
achieving improvement and perfection in whatever practices were central to 
them.  
Do we really have to change things in order to understand them? 
As these stories illustrate, there are many research-intrinsic reasons why con-
ventional social researchers should be interested in action research. The ex-
amples taken from conventional research methodology are examples of im-
manent critique. This is, in fact, an action research method starting out from 
within any existing practice. It does not have to be a research practice. Imma-
nent critique is nothing separate or extraneous to these practices. It is only 
making explicit tacit knowledge, and inner tensions and contradictions in 
such communities of practice or discourse formations provoking and promot-
ing the development, the explication, and the actualization of inherent poten-
tials in the practices. The examples from conventional research practices are 
just that: illustrative examples. Although immanent critique springs from 
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critical theory, from Marx and Hegel, and ultimately from Socrates, Plato, 
and Aristotle, as a practice – or as a “meta-practice” if you like – it has, of 
course, absolutely nothing to do with the hypertrophied household economies 
misnamed “communism” during the 20th Century. 
The practice of immanent critique is fundamentally dialogical. It is a 
learning process of improving practices through open examination and criti-
cism comparing ends and means and how they agree or disagree, making eve-
rything explicit that needs to be explicit in order to reach the ends. Immanent 
critique changes things but not as external things, technically. The point is 
not to change things technically (tékhnê / poíêsis). It is to think through prac-
tically formed concepts (= summarizing grasps), i.e. practically acquired ex-
perience (empeiría = Erfahrung not Erlebnis). Thinking through this is reflec-
tive thinking as dialogical thinking. The practice of immanent critique, criti-
cally examining any practice from the inside for inconsistencies of any kind 
in order to improve it, is nothing other than the basic principle of apprentice-
ship learning. Apprenticeship learning is a process of formation and perfec-
tion of a practice. It is a praxis, as this was understood by Aristotle. The 
meta-practice of masters and apprentices in a community of practice, inquiry, 
and learning is, of course, dialogical immanent critique enacting the method 
of methodology. 
Since Socrates’ practical turn to the practice of the crafts – and learning 
from the practice of ancient medicine – in order to understand what knowl-
edge was, instead of speculating and “metaphorizing” about what moved the 
stars and outer nature, this has been the common wisdom of all critics of 
similar research practices. As I have tried to show in other places (see end-
note 1), this Socratic, immanently critical, apprenticeship learning is also in-
trinsically connected to a concept of, not a general public sphere where rheto-
ric dominates, but a counter-public sphere or a leisured free space (skholê)
for dialogical reflection among practitioners. All of this, again, provides the 
tools for a form of organisational learning as action research or practitioner 
research approximating the method of methodology, alternating systemati-
cally between performance and reflection. Organisations are communities of 
practice in need of becoming communities of inquiry and learning as well. 
Collaboration between existing research institutions and work life organisa-
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tions should promote, support, and cultivate this internal transformation of 
existing communities of practice. 
The important thing, then, is not to intervene in the lives of others, chang-
ing them as some external objects in order to understand them. This may be 
the only way to learn experimentally and experientially about dead external 
materials with which we cannot communicate or share any practices and ex-
periences. In order to influence dead matter, we have to manipulate it. When 
it comes to social realities, however, the important thing (in order to under-
stand) is to go native on the right levels, to participate fully, trying to improve 
whatever we are involved in doing, changing and improving ourselves indi-
vidually and collectively, just like the community of researchers have been 
doing for decades through their discipline of methodology. This goes for eve-
ryone. The motto from experimentalism has to be modified. You do not have 
to change them in order to understand them. In order to understand anything, 
you have to practice. You have to go native, or realize that we are all always 
immersed as natives into some practices already, and provide the conditions 
for qualified participation by the natives in generating the necessary knowl-
edge. That’s where we have to start, in our own “nativeness”, whether we 
want to or not, and whether we know it or not. 
This, then, is a form of action research that whole-hearted conventional 
researchers are obliged to be interested in for their own sake (as “natives” to 
the research processes), for the sake of the quality of research as such, for the 
sake of the quality of organisational life, for the sake of their collegial rela-
tions, for the sake of participatory citizenship, and for other reasons I have 
tried to present in the foregoing text. This form of action research is also a 
form that will satisfy the subsidiary arguments provided on the way even bet-
ter than the variants motivated by research extrinsic reasons. It is the method 
of methodology, i.e. a self-reflective practitioner-research.
But everything implied and involved in an approach like this cannot be 
dealt with here. Its full range cannot be described. There may, of course, also 
be limitations to what can be studied through methods like these. But for the 
practical purpose of writing this text, this will have to suffice. Further re-
search will have to wait for other opportunities with even more leisure, re-
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lieved from the constant exigencies of practice. That’s how it is in the so-
called “real life”. 
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